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ABSTRACT
The aim of this study is to examine the relationships among perceptions
of implementation processes, implementation difficulties and value for
money (VFM) in UK school private finance initiative (PFI) or public
private partnership (PPP) contracts. The results suggest that
implementation factors, such as effective PFI ‘consultation’,
‘contractual’, ‘monitoring and review’ processes have a significantly
positive influence on perception of VFM. The results also suggest that
difficulties involved in actually implementing PFI processes, such as
‘lack of transparency’, ‘performance measurement difficulties’, ‘cultural
differences’ and ‘lack of authority’ have a significant and negative
influence on perception of VFM. These implementation difficulties were
also found to be inversely related with perception of the PFI
implementation processes but the extent of these relationships varied.
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INTRODUCTION
The private finance initiative (PFI) is increasingly used in the UK to fund major
capital investments. It involves a contractual agreement between the public sector
and a private sector consortium to design, build, finance and operate an asset over
a period of 25 years or more. PFI is a form of public private partnership. The terms
PFI and public private partnership (PPP) are used interchangeably – PFI is a specific
term used to refer to a contractual agreement with the private sector to provide a
service, mostly by designing, building, financing and operating (DBFO) an asset.
The term PFI was initially used by the UK Conservative government in 1992 when
the policy was officially launched. PPP is a broad term used to refer to all types of
partnership arrangements between the public sector and the private sector which
includes PFIs.
PFI/PPP contracts have been introduced in the UK and many other countries
(including Malaysia, mostly in the road and railway sectors) as part of the global
new public management (NPM) movement to deliver high quality public services.
NPM, which is premised on implementing private sector’s management practices
in the public sector, is expected to improve accountability and performance (Hood,
1995). PFIs play a fundamental role in public services globally and provides the
opportunity to examine the dynamic nature of their implementation processes
(Guthrie, Olson and Humphrey, 1999). PFIs also provide an exemplary case for
examining the pervasive use of NPM reforms aimed at ‘modernising’ the provision
of public services by bringing in private sector rationality and expertise in the
public sector (Broadbent and Laughlin, 2005).
The government claims that PFI offers value for money (VFM) in the form of
high quality and innovative public services (HM Treasury, 2000; 2003a; 2003b;
2004a). VFM is often defined in terms of costs, outputs and outcomes or economy,
efficiency and effectiveness. It is a problematic concept primarily because of the
difficulties involved in ‘measuring’ outcomes and the fact that its meanings are
rarely made explicit in public policies (Heald, 2003a; 2003b). Treasury guidance
on VFM is dominated by the ‘public sector comparator’ (PSC) which is a
hypothetical cost of the conventional procurement option used to benchmark PFI
costs, buildings and services (HM Treasury, 2003a). Other guidance containing
rules, policies and procedures have been issued to address the PFI consultation,
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contractual and management processes to implement PFI and deliver VFM over
the term of the contract (HM Treasury, 1999; 2003a; 2004a&b).
Prior studies have examined PFI contracts from various perspectives. For
example, some have critically examined the effectiveness of the PFI VFM appraisal
and procurement processes (Edwards and Shaoul, 2003) while others have examined
the post-implementation monitoring and review processes (Broadbent, Gill and
Laughlin, 2003; 2004; 2006). Yet others have examined users’ perception of the
PFI buildings and services outputs delivered by the private sector service provider
(Audit Commission, 2002; Cambridge Economic Policy Associates, 2005).
Although many studies have critically examined the PFI implementation
processes and identified a number of implementation difficulties which may hinder
VFM, no study has examined the relationships among perception of PFI
implementation processes, implementation difficulties and VFM. Hence, the
purpose of this study is to explore these complex relationships from the perspective
of headteachers of PFI schools. Three related research questions are investigated
in this study: (i) whether and if so, how are perceptions of PFI implementation
processes related to perceptions of VFM; (ii) whether and if so, how are perceptions
of PFI implementation difficulties (that is, lack of transparency, performance
measurement difficulties, cultural differences and lack of authority) related to
perceptions of VFM?; and, (iii) whether and if so, how are perceptions of PFI
implementation difficulties related to PFI implementation processes. To explain
these relationships, a theoretical model is developed and tested with empirical
data gathered from a survey.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: The ‘literature review
and hypotheses’ section clarifies the meaning of VFM and the school PFI
implementation processes, presents a theoretical model and a set of hypotheses.
Subsequent sections present the research method and a discussion of the results.
The final section presents the theoretical contributions, practical implications,
limitations and some directions for future research.
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LITERATURE REVIEW AND HYPOTHESES
Definition of constructs
Value for money in PFI contracts
VFM has not been defined in the UK government’s public policy documents on
PFI although the government has largely used the VFM rhetoric to justify the
expanding use of PFI contracts (Heald, 2003b). The government argues that PFIs
provide VFM in the form of cost-effective public services through innovative and
better managed public services than the conventional procurement alternative,
without putting the public sector’s capital at risk (HM Treasury, 2000). In the
context of school PFI contracts, the government posits that the PFI is expected to
“provide each school with a single point of contact for the provision of estate
services, simplifying the interface with school management, and maximising the
time spent by management on education outcomes rather than facilities” (DENI,
2005, p. 7). Audit Offices across the UK have examined the costs, the PFI buildings
and services outputs delivered by the private sector service provider and, to some
extent, the outcome objectives of PFI contracts, as part of their VFM investigations
(Audit Commission, 2002; Audit Scotland, 2002; NIAO, 2004; Cambridge
Economic Policy Associates, 2005). By drawing from these PFI studies, this paper
examines VFM in terms of perception of costs, outputs and outcomes (Glynn,
1985).
The Audit Commission, which is responsible for VFM audits of school PFI
contracts in England and Wales, examined the quality and cost of buildings and
services delivered under 17 PFI schemes in 2002 and those of conventional schools
(Audit Commission, 2002). It found a significant lapse in the quality of PFI buildings
and services and argued that these reflected the need to have better management of
the PFI procurement and contractual processes. In the case of the ‘successful’ PFI
schemes, the headteachers were involved in project negotiations from start to finish,
and worked very closely with the architects and builders, to ensure that the PFI
buildings and services delivered met the schools’ needs and expectations. Staff
morale and pupils’ behaviour were perceived to have improved. Participation and
good working relationships among “all stakeholders – school, local education
authorities (LEA) and contractor” were key to making the partnership work and to
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obtain VFM over the longer term. Overall the ‘users’ were pleased with their new
schools primarily because of the advantages of being in a modern building,
compared with the often dilapidated and outdated school it replaced.
The Northern Ireland Audit Office reviewed the first four PFI schools (termed
as ‘pathfinder schools’) in October 2004 (NIAO, 2004). Its main findings were
that, although the school PFI deals were economically and financially feasible, the
cost of the bids were very close to those of the PSC leading to only marginal VFM
benefits of the PFI option to the public sector - the Department of Education in
Northern Ireland (DENI) underestimated the cost consequences of procuring PFI
– it was procuring multiple PFI projects at the same time which was time consuming,
costly and caused delay; the public sector lacked the necessary skills in project
management, negotiation and contracting and this resulted in cost escalation; there
was limited innovation in both building design and services delivery; there was
inadequate coordination of long term enrolment planning across the local education
authorities resulting in a significant gap between planned and actual enrolments in
2 of the 4 PFI schools examined; and, post project evaluation (PPE) of the PFI
schools by the government department and local education authorities remained
to be carried out. The NIAO report (NIAO, 2004) also pointed out that improved
buildings and services could have a positive impact on educational attainment
through improved staff morale and pupils’ behaviour, albeit, there is no research
available yet to assess the existence of any effects of the learning environment on
the educational outcomes, pupils’ behaviour and ‘productivity’.
Ismail and Pendlebury (2006) surveyed 214 operational PFI schools to examine
the affordability of the PFI, its implementation and the perceptions of users about
the quality of the buildings and services delivered. The main findings were that the
share of the PFI charge paid by the schools was 10% on average and the staffing
costs averaged at 80%. The implication of fixed PFI payments is that it reduces
flexibility in terms of budget management by the schools and may adversely affect
staffing budgets in times of financial difficulties. The authors also found that the
management of the PFI contract is more problematic in ‘large’ projects than in
‘small’ projects. In terms of buildings and services outputs, the majority of the
respondents felt that the quality of the school buildings was good or very good
whereas only half of the respondents felt that the quality of the services was good
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or very good. In terms of outcomes, 70% of the respondents agreed that the
PFI has improved staff morale whereas only about half of the respondents
agreed that the productivity of staff was enhanced and the behaviour of pupils
improved.
Based on the preceding studies, VFM in the case of school PFI contracts
involves consideration of PFI costs, buildings and services outputs actually delivered
by the private sector contractor, and the broader government objectives of enabling
headteachers to focus on educational outcomes and improving staff and pupils’
morale and productivity.
PFI implementation processes and implementation difficulties
This study focuses on three PFI implementation processes – consultation,
contractual and monitoring and review processes – primarily because of their
relevance to headteachers. Consultation with PFI users, during the output
specification and bidder selection process, is essential to meet users’ needs and
requirements over the operational phase of the PFI contracts. Consultation process
may be defined as the structures, policies and procedures used to obtain the ‘active’
participation of stakeholder groups affected by a particular policy and seeking
their legitimacy (Francis, 1990; Lehman, 2006). In the context of PFI contracts, it
involves identifying the needs of headteachers and teachers at the early stages of
PFI procurement on the expected outputs and reaching agreement on how these
expectations would be met. It would thus include consideration of the feedback of
users on the various PFI bids proposed by the private sector to select those which
best meets their needs.
The contractual process broadly involves translation of the outputs specified
by users into binding legal agreements. This process would includes agreement on
how good performance would be rewarded and poor performance sanctioned; how
changes in service requirements, including termination, would be dealt with; and,
how performance would be monitored. The output of this process would be the
PFI contract, which is often a complex document containing legally binding terms
dictating the level and quality of service; payment mechanism; length of the contract;
allocation of risks; mechanisms for dealing with changes in services requirements;
PFI service benchmarking and profit sharing mechanisms (Office of Government
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and Commerce, 2002). The PFI contract plays a key role in governing the provision
of public services over the life of the project. Froud (2003) argues that because
VFM is a long-term concept and services requirements constantly change, the
contractual terms would always be incomplete. As such, flexibility and trust among
the partners are important considerations to make the partnership work and obtain
VFM (Tomkins, 2001). There are three main problems associated with PFI
contracting - ‘adverse selection’, ‘information asymmetry’ and ‘moral hazard’
(Salanie, 1997; Tomkins, 2001; Froud, 2003). The mechanism designed to reduce
adverse selections in PFIs is the bidding process - it reveals the characteristics of
the consortiums in terms of the riskiness of their proposals and their capacity to
deliver. In the case of PFIs, some of the mechanisms used to foster goal congruence
and reduce the problem of moral hazard are the PFI contract, the ‘performance
monitoring and review processes’ and ‘payment mechanism’. These are designed
to reward PFI contractors for satisfactory performance and penalise them for poor
performance.
The Post implementation ‘monitoring and review’ process of PFI services
actually delivered by the service provider enables PFI managers in the public and
private sectors to respond to the changing needs and requirements of users over
the longer term. HM Treasury guidance advises government departments to put in
place relevant PFI monitoring and review mechanisms to safeguard public interest
to enable PFI contracts to deliver the VFM benefits foreseen at the procurement
stages (HM Treasury, 2003a&b; 2004a&b). In this respect the Office of Government
and Commerce (2002) states that the PFI contract should make provision to enable
the local authority to monitor the service provider’s performance against the outputs
specified in the contract. However, although representatives from both the public
and private sectors are involved in the service review process, the preparation of
performance reports in school PFI contracts are largely within the control of the
private sector.
Some studies have identified a number of factors which may adversely affect
PFI implementation processes and VFM as a result (Acar and Robertson, 2004;
Edwards and Shaoul, 2003; Edwards, Shaoul, Stafford, and Arblaster, 2004). It is
often argued that ‘lack of transparency’ in the PFI processes - for example, due to
unavailability and inadequate access to information or reports on the procurement
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process, payments made to the private sector, and services actually delivered by
the PFI contractor - poses a barrier to the discharge of accountability and the
assessment of VFM (Edwards, et al. 2004). Difficulties involved in measuring the
quality of services delivered by the private sector (referred to as ‘performance
measurement difficulties’ in this paper) may hinder the implementation of the
financial rewards and sanctions in PFI contracts and may adversely affect VFM
(Hyndman and Anderson, 1995; Cavalluzzo and Ittner, 2004). Moreover, Acar
and Robertson (2004) posit that differences in working practices between the public
sector and private sector (referred to as ‘cultural differences’ in this paper) may
lead to conflict and sour working relationships. In the case of school PFI contracts,
Edwards and Shaoul (2003) further argue that because PFI contracts are between
the private sector and the local education authority, schools lack authority to enforce
PFI contracts and this may hinder VFM.
Theoretical model and hypotheses
Figure 1 presents a summary of the theoretical model used to examine the
relationships among the PFI implementation processes, implementation difficulties
and VFM objectives. Effective consultation, contractual and monitoring and review
processes are expected to enable the discharge of accountability and enable VFM
objectives to be achieved (See for example, Edwards and Shaoul, 2003; Froud,
2003; Chenhall, 2003). Arguably, these three PFI implementation processes do
not operate in isolation but interact with and feed back into each other. For example,
in the case of PFIs, the consultation process involves dialogue among interest
groups to identify their needs and specify the required outputs, while the contractual
process involves translating the outputs specified into binding legal agreements.
The PFI contract would contain agreement regarding the services to be delivered
and would form the basis for monitoring and review at the post implementation
stage. Corrective actions, in cases of deviations from plans, would be undertaken
and the changing needs and expectations of users over the life of the contract
would be catered for through the monitoring and review process – for example, in
cases of requests for new classrooms or termination of the PFI agreement, the
LEA and the private sector would revert back to the contract to implement the
terms and procedures initially agreed upon.
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On the other hand, it is expected that barriers to effective implementation of
public policies are likely to have an inverse relationship with perception of
implementation processes and VFM (Acar and Robertson, 2004; Cavalluzzo and
Ittner, 2004). Edwards, et al. (2004) argue that lack of transparency in PFI processes,
such as unavailability or inadequate access to PFI information, is likely to hinder
accountability and the assessment of VFM.    Performance measurement difficulties
– that is, difficulties involved in measuring the quality of PFI services delivered by
the private sector – is expected to obstruct the effective implementation of the
financial reward and sanction system in PFI contracts (Froud, 2003). Cultural
differences between the public and private sectors and lack of authority by the
schools to influence the private sector service provider may sour working
relationships and result in schools not receiving VFM from their service providers
(Edwards and Shaoul, 2003; Froud, 2003; Shaoul, 2005; Henri, 2006a&b). The
Figure 1 Hypothesized model linking PFI implementation processes,
implementation difficulties and VFM
PFI implementation processes
Consultation
Contractual
Monitoring and review
H2b
–
Lack of transparency
Measurement difficulties
Cultural differences
Lack of authority
PFI implementation processes
Costs
Outputs
Outcomes
H1
+
H2a
–
VFM
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following sub-sections further elaborate on these expected relationships and present
the hypotheses.
Relationships between PFI implementation processes and VFM
It is often argued that the ultimate VFM outcome of PFIs depend on how PFI
policies and guidance formulated at the macro level are executed at the micro
organizational level (Broadbent and Laughlin, 1999; English and Guthrie, 2006).
Indeed, the government has issued numerous guides on the consultation (HM
Treasury, 1999), contractual (HM Treasury, 2004a), and monitoring and review
(HM Treasury, 2003a; 2004b) processes to implement PFIs, but many researchers
have questioned their effectiveness and rationale in terms of achieving VFM
(Edwards and Shaoul, 2003; Froud, 2003).
Representatives from PFI schools are consulted during the procurement process
to enable the LEAs to incorporate the demands and needs of users in the final PFI
contract (HM Treasury, 1999). For example, a PFI school headteacher would collate
and pass on requests received from teachers to the LEA to prepare an output
specification document. The LEA is expected to negotiate with the private sector
bidders to obtain the best deal and provide feedback on the prospective bids to the
headteachers and teachers before making a final decision. In this respect, effective
consultation and contractual processes are expected to have a positive influence
on VFM.
However, Edwards and Shaoul (2003) argue that PFIs may not deliver VFM
where there are conflicting expectations among stakeholders which are not well
managed. Using the Pimlico School PFI as a case study, Edwards and Shaoul
(2003) argue that PFI consultation processes were not effective in meeting
stakeholders’ needs and the PFI contract did not transfer risks to the contractors in
the way that was anticipated at the negotiation stage. This ultimately led to the
demise of the PFI contract.
Froud (2003) argues that because VFM is a long-term concept and contracts
cannot cater for every eventuality, PFI contractual terms agreed to at the
procurement stage would always be incomplete. Although PFI contracts contain
provisions or clauses to cope with changing requirements of users and sharing of
unexpected gains and termination, it locks the estate and reduces its ability to
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respond to uncertainty (p. 582). Thus the extent to which the PFI contract adequately
reflects both the current needs as well as future needs of the school and how or in
whose favour the contract is drawn may have important ramifications on VFM.
PFI contracts include ‘monitoring and review’ processes to oversee and steer
its course over the longer term. This process mainly involves the LEA, the school
and private sector service provider reviewing the ‘performance reports’ produced
by the service provider. Tomkins (2001) further states that as the partnership
matures, the level of trust increases over time and the information needed to ‘control’
the relationship decreases. It is expected that headteachers who are satisfied with
the services monitoring and review process are more likely to perceive that they
are obtaining VFM. However, although most projects include monitoring and
review processes at the ‘micro’ level, many researchers have pointed out that there
is a lack of post project evaluation of PFI projects at the respective Departmental
levels (e.g. Education, Health and roads) and by Parliamentary bodies such as the
National Audit Office and Public Accounts Committee (Broadbent, Gill and
Laughlin, 2003). Broadbent, Gill and Laughlin (2006) found that post project
evaluation of PFI contracts was mostly geared towards monitoring of services
delivered through facilities management systems while other qualitative factors
and risk transfer were not systematically evaluated.
Taken together, the need for better consultation, contractual and monitoring
and review processes to improve VFM suggests the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 1. Perception of PFI implementation processes is
positively related to perception of VFM.
PFI implementation difficulties and VFM
Many researchers have highlighted that certain factors, such as lack of transparency,
performance measurement difficulties, cultural differences between the public and
private sector and lack of authority may adversely affect VFM objectives. For
example, Heald  (2003a) argues that, although transparency is essential for
promoting public accountability in government spending, transparency is positively
associated with ‘effectiveness’ only up to a certain optimal level. Hood and Heald
(2006) further state that while the benefits associated with increasing transparency
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may outweigh its costs, there may be a trade off between its ‘quantity’ and ‘quality’.
Similarly, in the case of PFI in roads and hospitals, Edwards, Shaoul, Stafford,
Arblaster (2004) stated that the difficulties experienced by their research team in
obtaining PFI information “do not generate much hope that patients, road users,
taxpayers and other citizens can see how society’s resources are being used” and
that “there is little information about the impact of PFI contracts on the performance
of the procurer, and there is a build-up of commitments and implicit guarantees
within very long-term contracts about which there is little transparency” (See also,
Cavalluzzo and Ittner (2004, pp. 260-261) who found that lack of transparency
and decision making authority were significantly and negatively associated with
the extent to which managers are held accountable for performance in the US
public sector).
Edwards and Shaoul (2003) examined how the control procedures designed
to ensure VFM ‘failed’ in the context of a PFI school in the UK. They argued that
the conflicting interests of the LEA and the school generated difficulties in terms
of meeting the identified needs of the school. This problem arose primarily because
the PFI contract is between the private sector and the LEA and not the school
which had limited input and lacked authority in the PFI decision making processes.
Although schools monitor and manage their respective PFI contracts, it is the LEA
that needs to enforce them. However, if the LEA fails to enforce the performance
standards initially agreed upon, then the school has little redress and pupils and
teachers would suffer as a result. The authors further argue that there is tension
between “promoting the use of PFI and ensuring that it is only used in ways that
meet the objectives of greater efficiency and VFM” so that it does not ‘drive’ the
procurement processes because of the general perception that the government would
only make money available for PFI as opposed to conventional procurement (See
also, Ismail and Pendlebury, 2006 who made similar observations).
In the case of school public–private partnership contracts in the US, Acar and
Robertson (2004) explained that participants in public–private partnerships face
the challenge of influencing the behaviour and performance of individuals coming
from different organizations without having the requisite formal authority to do
so. They argue that although participants may face pressure from formal
organisational and PPP specific structures, they nonetheless develop and adhere to
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‘soft’ systems as alternative means to achieve the desired VFM/performance
objectives. Further difficulties associated with implementing PPP policies in schools
and achieving VFM were found to stem from the availability of and access to
information, measurability constraints arising from the very nature of many
partnership programs and activities, personal differences and frequent changes in
personnel.
From the preceding analysis of some of the difficulties faced when
implementing PFIs and their adverse influence on VFM, the following two
hypotheses ensue:
Hypothesis 2a. Perception of PFI implementation difficulties (that is, lack of
transparency, performance measurement difficulties, cultural differences
between the public and private sector, and lack of authority by the school) are
negatively related to perception of VFM.
Hypothesis 2b. Perception of PFI implementation difficulties are negatively
related to perception of PFI implementation processes
Research method
Sample and data collection
In order to test the hypotheses, data were collected through the use of a structured
questionnaires which were sent to headteachers of 332 operational PFI schools in
the UK. A database of PFI schools was developed by contacting the relevant local
education authorities and the departments of education in England, Wales, Scotland
and Northern Ireland.
An initial questionnaire was developed based on a review of relevant literature.
This was sent to fellow academics for their comments. It was revised and pilot
tested, in May 2005, on six PFI schools (two located in England, two located in
Scotland, one located in Wales and another based in Northern Ireland). The
questionnaire was further revised based on the feedback received and finally
administered between October 2005 and January 2006. School headteachers who
did not respond to the initial mailings were sent a follow-up questionnaire towards
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the end of November 2005. Follow up telephone calls were made to non-respondents
in January 2006 to increase the response rate.
143 usable responses were received from the 332 UK PFI schools surveyed
(162 replies in total were received - 16 respondents replied but refused to take part
in the survey and 3 questionnaires were unusable; the usable response rate was
thus 43%). Final sample sizes for some of the variables used in the analysis were
less than 143 due to the common problem of missing data. Early and late respondents
were compared to detect any differences in the mean score of each variable. A
comparison of the means of the variables showed no significant differences between
early and late respondents.
Measurement and validation of constructs
Most measures were drawn from literature and existing survey instruments (Audit
Commission, 2002; Audit Scotland, 2002; Acar and Robertson, 2004; Cavalluzzo
and Ittner, 2004; Ismail and Pendlebury, 2006). The survey instrument is similar
to that used by Cavalluzzo and Ittner (2004) whereby respondents’ ‘agreement’
with the statements made were assessed on a five point Likert Scale (Scale 1= no
extent, 2=small extent, 3=moderate extent, 4=great extent, 5=very great extent).
This instrument was used because of the similarity of the theoretical models and
statistical analyses employed.
Multiple questions were used to examine each construct of implementation
processes, implementation difficulties and VFM. Confirmatory factor analysis
was used to: reduce the multi-dimensionality of the questions, minimize
measurement error,and, establish convergent validity. All the variables loaded better
than 0.50 on the respective factors. Construct reliability was assessed using
Cronbach coefficient alphas. All the Cronbach Alpha coefficients exceeded the
recommended cut-off level of 0.70 (Nunnally, 1978). Specific questions, descriptive
statistics, reliability and factor analyses for the survey items used are shown in
Table 1.
In general, except for the negotiation of the unitary payments where they did
not have much influence, headteachers seem to be satisfied with the PFI consultation
process (mean>3). However, the PFI contract was not perceived favourably
(mean<3), especially in terms of its ability to deal with future changes in service
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requirements (mean=2.26) and its reflection of the future needs of the school
(mean=2.44). Although the headteachers perceived the service review
meetings with the service provider to be very useful (mean=3.30), the usefulness
of the service review reports prepared by the facilities manager as well as the
accuracy of the reports were perceived less favourably (mean=2.68 and 2.84
respectively).
‘Cultural differences’ between the school and the PFI service provider was
perceived to be one of the most important difficulties faced when implementing
PFI processes (mean>3). This was followed by performance measurement
difficulties in PFI programmes, lack of authority and lack of transparency in the
PFI processes respectively.
Headteachers perceived that they received more value from payments made
with regards to the PFI buildings (mean=3.31) than for the services (mean=2.58)
and in general, agreed to a small and moderate extent that penalties in PFI contracts
do incentivise good performance or penalise poor performance (mean=2.73). As
regards the buildings and services delivered, headteachers were generally more
satisfied with the PFI buildings (mean>2.99) than with the services (mean<3) and
agreed only to a small extent that the private sector was innovative in the provision
of PFI services (mean=2.23). However, headteachers seem satisfied that the PFI is
having a favourable impact on: staff morale (mean=3.39), staff productivity
(mean=3.17), pupils’ productivity (mean=3.35) and pupils’ behaviour (mean=3.15).
The PFI is also perceived to help provide schools which are conducive to learning
(mean=3.34).
CORRELATION
Table 2 shows the correlation matrices among the variables used in this study.
Most of the associations are significant at the 1% level (two-tailed). Despite the
significant correlations, all Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) scores (not reported)
were below 2.5, indicating no serious problems with multi-collinearity in subsequent
regression models. Tabachnick and Fiddell (2001, p. 84) further advise researchers
to “think carefully before including two variables with a bivariate correlations
coefficient of 0.7 or more in the same analysis”. With the exception of OUTPUTS
and OUTCOMES, all the correlation coefficients were less than 0.7 further
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confirming that there was no serious multi-collinearity problem. Therefore, all
variables were retained in the regression models.
Perhaps the most important and contentious question relevant to PFIs is
whether, as emphasised in government publications, PFI implementation processes
and VFM objectives are indeed related. Consistent with these claims and literature
(see for example, Acar, 2004; Cavalluzzo and Ittner, 2004), PFI implementation
processes are positively associated with VFM while PFI implementation difficulties
are negatively associated with VFM. Moreover, perceptions of PFI implementation
processes and implementation difficulties are negatively associated.
RESULTS
The hypotheses are now tested by examining the relationships between: (1)
perception of PFI implementation processes and perception of VFM (hypothesis
1); (2) perception of PFI implementation difficulties and VFM (hypothesis 2a);
and, (3) perception of PFI implementation processes and perception of PFI
implementation difficulties (hypothesis 2b).
H1: PFI implementation processes and VFM
The influence of perceptions of PFI implementation processes on VFM is first
examined. As Pizzini (2006) notes, the key to evaluating the effectiveness of
government policies is to assess the extent to which the institutionalised systems
actually enable the delivery of policy objectives.
Table 3 displays the results of the relationship between perceptions of the
effectiveness of PFI implementation processes and VFM. The regression
equations are highly significant, with an adjusted R2 of 52.5%, 55.3% and 41.1%
respectively.
Consistent with hypothesis H1, the results show that VFM constructs are
significantly and positively influenced by perceptions of CONSULTATION,
CONTRACTUAL and MONITORING AND REVIEW processes. These results
provide further empirical support to previous PFI studies (for example, Edward
and Shaoul 2003; Froud 2003) on the importance of effective PFI implementation
processes to meet and respond to the changing needs and expectations of users.
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Only, CONSULTATION PROCESS did not seem to have a significant
influence on perception of COSTS. This may possibly be because headteachers
perceive that they have limited control over the determination of the unitary
payments during the consultation process and over the administration of financial
penalties after the PFI contract is implemented.
H2a: PFI implementation difficulties and VFM
The influence of the perception of PFI implementation difficulties on perception
of VFM is now examined. Table 4 shows that the resulting regression models are
highly significant, with an adjusted R2 of 45.4%, 41.3% and 29.0% respectively.
Consistent with Hypothesis H2a, all measures of PFI implementation difficulties
are negatively associated with perceptions of VFM. However, the extent of these
inverse relationships varies.
This study finds mixed evidence that perception of LACK OF
TRANSPARENCY in PFI is related to VFM. LACK OF TRANSPARENCY is
negatively and significantly associated with perceptions of OUTPUTS, suggesting
Table 3 Relationships between PFI implementation processes and VFM
Hypothesized COSTS  OUTPUTS OUTCOMES
sign
Intercept 0.746* 0.709* 1.047*
 (3.812) (3.757) (4.196)
1. CONSULTATION PROCESS + 0.039 0.200* 0.216**
(0.519)  (2.754)  (2.242)
2. CONTRACTUAL PROCESS + 0.387* 0.322* 0.326*
(4.668)  (4.040)  (3.090)
3. MONITORING AND REVIEW + 0.327* 0.261* 0.242*
3. PROCESS (4.837) (3.950)  (2.826)
Adjusted R2 0.525 0.553 0.411
F-statistic 52.119* 58.343* 33.630*
Sample size 139 139 140
Ordinary least squares coefficients, with corresponding t-statistics in parentheses.
* indicate significant at the 0.01 level (two-tailed).
** indicate significant at the 0.05 level (two-tailed).
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that unavailability of information on the performance of the service providers
negatively influences assessment of the buildings and services outputs delivered.
However, LACK OF TRANSPARENCY is unrelated to perceptions of COSTS
and OUTCOMES.
MEASUREMENT DIFFICULTIES are negatively and significantly associated
with perceptions of COSTS but not with perceptions of OUTPUTS and
OUTCOMES. The significant negative association between MEASUREMENT
DIFFICULTIES and perceptions of COSTS imply that unitary payments based
penalties and rewards systems are not perceived favourably in cases where there
are significant difficulties associated with measuring the performance of the
contractors. CULTURAL DIFFERENCES are negatively and significantly related
to perceptions of OUTPUTS and OUTCOMES but not COSTS. On the other hand,
LACK OF AUTHORITY is significantly and inversely related to all the constructs
of VFM suggesting that schools that have greater power in the PFI processes are
more likely to perceive that they are obtaining VFM from the PFI buildings and
services actually delivered.
Table 4 Relationships between PFI implementation difficulties and VFM
Hypothesized COSTS  OUTPUTS OUTCOMES
sign
Intercept 4.752* 4.814* 5.008*
(24.177) (23.731) (19.170)
1. LACK OF TRANSPARENCY - -0.094 -0.175** -0.033
(-1.166) (-2.087)  (-0.306)
2. MEASUREMENT - -0.168** -0.012 -0.038
2. DIFFICULTIES (-2.093)  (-0.142)  (-0.351)
3. CULTURAL DIFFERENCES - -0.081 -0.238* -0.200**
(-1.099)  (-3.112) (-2.031)
4. LACK OF AUTHORITY - -0.305* -0.191* -0.301*
(-5.200) (-3.159) (-3.862)
Adjusted R2 0.454 0.413 0.290
F-statistic 30.128* 25.672* 15.406*
Sample size 140 140 140
Ordinary least squares coefficients, with corresponding t-statistics in parentheses.
* indicate significant at the 0.01 level (two-tailed).
** indicate significant at the 0.05 level (two-tailed).
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Although the results show that many of the implementation difficulties
constructs have a negative influence on perception of VFM, these results only
provide partial support to hypothesis H2a.
H2b: PFI implementation difficulties and PFI implementation
processes
Table 5 shows the results of the influence of PFI implementation difficulties on
PFI consultation, contractual and monitoring and review processes. Due to missing
responses for some of the variables, the sample size ranged from 139 to 141. The
resulting regressions are highly significant, with an adjusted R2 of 33.7%, 45.4%
and 44.1% respectively.
In the case of the influence of PFI implementation difficulties in the
CONSULTATION and CONTRACTUAL process, only LACK OF AUTHORITY
was significant. Consistent with Edwards and Shaoul (2003), the perceived lack of
authority by the schools to influence PFI consultation processes at the procurement
stage of PFI contract is relatively higher.
With the exception of the MEASUREMENT DIFFICULTIES construct,
LACK OF TRANSPARENCY, CULTURAL DIFFERENCES and LACK OF
AUTHORITY seem to be significant barriers in the MONITORING AND REVIEW
PROCESS. These results may be explained by the fact that only at the post PFI
implementation stages do headteachers play a more active role in the management
of their respective PFI schools and perceive the lack of transparency by the private
sector, cultural differences between the schools and the private sector and the lack
of authority of the schools to be more prevalent.
One result that differs from hypothesis H2b is the insignificant relationship
between MEASUREMENT DIFFICULTIES (that is, the difficulties of assessing
the quality of services and the impact of PFI programmes and, lack of financial
resources to gather and analyse PFI information) and all the three PFI
implementation processes. Thus, contrary to hypothesis H2b, MEASUREMENT
DIFFICULTIES do not appear to significantly affect PFI implementation processes.
Cavaluzzo and Ittner (2004, p. 260) also found that “difficulties selecting and
interpreting appropriate performance metrics (METRIC DIFFICULTIES) have
no direct effect on accountability” processes in US governmental organisations.
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Overall, the preceding findings are consistent with prior studies exploring
factors which perversely influence the implementation of public policies in general
and PFI in particular. These results suggest that, the problems and challenges of
making PFI post implementation processes more transparent, the differences in
ethos and working practices between the public and private sector and the power
differentials in the PFI processes need to be addressed if they are to be made and
perceived as more effective.
CONCLUSION
The objective of this study was to examine the relationships among perception of
the PFI implementation processes, implementation difficulties and VFM.
Overall the results suggest a significantly positive relationship between
perception of most of the PFI implementation processes and perception of VFM
(H1) – headteachers who perceive the PFI implementation processes as effective
are more likely to perceive that they are obtaining VFM at the post implementation
stage. This finding highlights the importance of effective PFI consultation,
contractual and monitoring and review processes to achieve VFM in UK school
PFI contracts. However, the results on the influence of PFI implementation
difficulties and VFM were mixed while those on the influence of PFI
implementation difficulties on PFI consultation and contractual processes were
weak. Nevertheless, these results imply that barriers to the effective implementation
of PFI policies should be identified and removed. In particular, ‘active’ participation
of users, effective contractual processes and monitoring and review mechanisms
are some of the issues that need to be given due consideration by the government,
if PFIs are to deliver the promised VFM over the longer term.
Previous studies have highlighted the problematic nature of certain aspects of
the PFI consultation, contractual and monitoring and review processes but have
not examined their overall influences on VFM. This study contributes to PFI
literature by developing an exploratory model to link PFI implementation processes
with VFM and testing it. Second, this study is expected to provide better
understanding of the relationships between PFI implementation processes, PFI
implementation difficulties and VFM in the context of school PFI contracts in the
UK. This paper explored these relationships by examining three types of
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implementation processes relevant to PFI users and four factors hindering their
effectiveness and has further opened the debate concerning the role of PFI
implementation processes in improving VFM.
Similar to other empirical studies, this study has potential limitations and the
findings should be interpreted with caution. First, only the PFI implementation
processes relevant to headteachers were examined. However, there may be other
factors influencing VFM which have not been considered. Second, perception of
implementation processes and VFM is subjective and has been measured using a
subjective instrument which only reflects certain dimensions relevant to school
PFI contracts. There is thus potential for bias. Third, the scope of this research is
limited to examining the views of headteachers of PFI schools. The views of other
stakeholders such as teachers and pupils were not sought.    Finally, the findings of
this study are only applicable to UK school PFI contracts and should ideally not be
generalised.
Being exploratory in nature, this study has opened some avenues for future
research as follows. This study may be replicated across other types of PFI contracts
(for example, PFI contracts in hospitals) to examine the extent to which the
hypothesised relationships between implementation processes, implementation
difficulties and VFM are relevant in other contexts and in other countries. Future
research could investigate, through discourse with the relevant stakeholders
involved in PFI contracts, the effectiveness of the consultation, contractual and
monitoring and review processes, factors hindering their effectiveness and their
implications for VFM – there are opportunities for further research to examine the
implementation and evaluation of PPP contracts across the globe, including
Malaysia. Moreover, there is also the opportunity to examine perceptions of
implementation processes and VFM in conventional public sector procurement
projects and to contrast them with PFI projects.
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